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Power and Legal Artifice: The Federal Class Action

Bryant G. Garth

Using case studies and interviews with lawyers and representatives in
class actions, this article explores the contribution that class actions make to
their ostensible beneficiaries. The article first distinguishes the major types
of class actions in terms of the roles of lawyers and class representatives,
ranging from very passive representatives to individuals intensively involved
with the dispute that gave rise to the litigation. The article next seeks to evaluate the class actions. On the basis of the results of the class actions, the
article finds that class actions cannot be proclaimed major contributors to
social change. The focus on results, however, is somewhat misleading. The
class action plays a much more significant role through its impact on the parties as litigants and as individuals involved with a dispute. To understand this
dimension, which has applications beyond the class action, the article suggests that the dispute transformation perspective should be modified to go
beyond the metaphor of a dispute that changes form as it goes through different processes. Disputants in the class action can be thought of as an audience that interprets itself-and is empowered or disempowered-in part by
what it learns from watching a legal dramatization of the dispute.

T
e federal class action invites scrutiny as a political institution (Mather 1982; Minow 1991; Yeazell 1989). Class actions
permit individual litigants and their attorneys to construct a
formal collectivity, the class, without actually mobilizing a
group or even securing the assent of those who become the
members of the class (see generally Yeazell 1987). Since the
reform of federal class actions in 1966, class actions have become charged with a political significance beyond any other institutions of civil procedure (cf. Resnik 1991:46-50). Liberal
supporters of public law litigation champion the class action as
a device to promote the social change promised by civil rights
laws and the constitutional values of equal protection and due
process (Chayes 1976; Harvard Law Review 1976). Conservatives have shown their distrust of class actions by imposing seThe research for this article was funded originally by a grant from the Law and
Social Sciences Division of the National Science Foundation. The author would like to
thank Shari Diamond, William Felstiner, Ilene Nagel, Austin Sarat, Peter Siegelman,
and Joan Steinman, each of whom offered useful suggestions for the improvement of
this manuscript.
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vere limits on its availability to publicly funded advocates in
legal services offices (Kessler 1990). Critics from the left, in
turn, have wondered if class actions actually limit social change
by channeling resources and energy away from the organization of individuals and instead into a formal construct dominated by an attorney (Bell 1976; Simon 1984:488, 489).
This article explores the politics of the class action through
an empirical analysis of concluded federal class actions from
the Northern District of California. It will assess critically the
"social change" impact of this unique, politically charged, procedural artifice.' The key terms of a political assessment are not
easily defined. There is no general agreement on what constitutes success or failure in lawsuits that typically end in negotiated settlements or how to determine if a legal proceeding affects the power of individuals and groups in social relationships. Nevertheless, as will be seen, we can use detailed case
studies to draw a number of conclusions about power and success in class action litigation. The most obvious conclusion is
that there are several very different types of class actions and
that even within types there is an enormous range of political
possibilities.
A second conclusion, one also quite consistent with studies
of litigation generally, is that class actions cannot measure up
to any interpretation that loads them with political significance
for their overall contribution to social change. We see neither
much evidence of social change nor much evidence of the inhibition of potential social movements for change. If class actions
have political significance, we do not see it if we look for the
mobilization of disadvantaged groups or the winning of momentous litigation that translates into social change.
Detailed case studies, however, invite a more subtle analysis. Building on the insights of the "dispute transformation"
literature (Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat 1980-81; Mather & Yngvesson 1980-81) and subsequent work that draws on it, we can
shift the context of the political analysis from global results to
the nuances of the process and the interactions among the participants. This approach concentrates on the local-level
processes of constructing parties as individuals and litigants.
From this perspective, the class action can be seen to have sevI As shown in an earlier article on class actions and private attorneys general
(Garth, Nagel, & Plager 1988), the incidence of class actions, the legal theories that
lawyers develop, the evidence that they use, and the ability to police a settlement depend crucially on what goes on in the governmental sphere. Class actions can be understood best as private law enforcement on the periphery of the regulatory state. Lawyers and class representatives gain or lose power more from public activities outside of
the lawyer-representative-class relationship than from their own conduct of litigation.
Nevertheless, this article to some extent abstracts the device of the class action away
from the impact of macro-level policies and practices and tries to focus on the practices
facilitated by the class action device itself.
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eral significant empowering features that may distinguish it
from ordinary litigation. In particular, the process of aggregation into the form of a class action tends to change the behavior
of the attorneys representing the class in ways that promote a
more intense scrutiny of the challenged conduct of the defendant. More surprisingly, the class action form, especially the
naming of parties as class representative, turns out in many
cases to embolden and strengthen the power of these individuals involved in the case.
Finally, the approach that permits these findings suggests a
need to modify the dispute transformation perspective generally as a tool to study disputing and litigation. The sensitivity of
the dispute transformation approach is essential to understand
the dynamics of class action litigation, but it can be misleading
as a metaphor. The metaphor of "dispute transformation" suggests the story of "a" dispute that changes shape by "going
through" the legal system. Such an account distracts researchers from the levels at which different forms of the dispute operate simultaneously and how the levels relate to each other. As
suggested in the conclusion, multiple transformations derive
from relationships akin to those between involved audiences
and legal dramatizations of their own stories and concerns. The
class actions suggest that the litigants' individual struggles
outside the legal process are affected-indeed their personal
identities in part constructed-by how they see themselves portrayed in the unfolding legal drama.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part I, drawing on scholarly literature exemplifying the post-"dispute transformation"
era, provides a theoretical setting for the discussion of the empirical data and describes the basic categories of class action
litigation. Part II describes the empirical study on which the
article is based. Part III presents nine case studies in some detail, and they are scrutinized critically in Parts IV and V. Part IV
applies a skeptical political approach to the case studies, showing the limits of the achievements of the class actions, while
Part V shifts the context for a more sympathetic interpretation
of the case studies. Part VI presents concluding observations,
including suggestions about research into litigation generally.
I. Power and Litigation after the Development of the
Dispute Transformation Perspective
The literature on dispute transformation, introduced by
two well-known articles in 1981 (Felstiner et al. 1980-81;
Mather & Yngvesson 1980-81), provided a novel way to explain why even litigation that resulted in strong settlements or
victories in court did not necessarily lead to solutions of the
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conflicts that gave rise to litigation. Indeed, litigation could
sometimes be seen to ignore those conflicts.
The dispute transformation perspective represented an advance over a line of empirical studies, inspired by Edelman
(1964) and later Scheingold (1974), that attempted to learn
more mechanistically when legal advocacy promoted "real" as
opposed to "symbolic" change. The new perspective showed
that it was not just that the haves could use courts more strategically than the have nots (Galanter 1974), or that litigation victories do not necessarily change behavior in ways favorable to
the "winners" (Handler 1978; cf. Olson 1984); but the process
of moving from a social relationship of conflict to a lawsuit inevitably entails a translation into legal language. Such a legal
translation, however, does not exhaust the possibilities for dispute transformation. The dispute changes form, expands or
contracts or changes in focus, in response to numerous contextual factors. As a research perspective, dispute transformation
effectively united the concerns about power of the political
scientists and the sense of language and detail of anthropologists.
The generation of scholarship that followed has taken several approaches (cf. Trubek 1988). One approach has been to
emphasize the political downside of dispute transformation, as
Kristin Bumiller did with considerable sophistication in The
Civil Rights Society (1988). Bumiller suggests that civil rights victims gain little and lose much by letting the legal system have
their dispute: "Instead of providing a tool to lessen inequality,
legal mechanisms, which create the identity of the discrimination victim, maintain division between the powerful and the
powerless by means that are obscured by the ideology of equal
protection" (ibid., p. 2). The ideology embedded in the legal
system impedes the political empowerment of women and minorities (see also Lanoue & Lee 1987).
A second approach has been to try to get beyond context
sensitivity toward some predictive model of dispute transformation. Canan, Satterfield, Larson, and Kretzmann (1990), for
example, recently sought to learn about lawsuits that seek to
chill constitutionally protected political activity. They found
that such lawsuits, which force unwilling political activists into a
legal arena, succeed or fail in "derailing" the political claims
largely on the basis of whether the disputes "were initially tied
to a broad cultural or political claims base" (ibid., p. 950).
Those tied to the broader base tend to survive the "killing by
narrowing" strategy of the opposition. Such predictive generalizations about narrowing or expansion, however, are very difficult to make in settings where, as they note, context is crucial.
Sally Merry's recent and nuanced account of individual confrontations with the courts is especially relevant to the ques-
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tions raised here. In a study of the efforts of plaintiffs with relatively minor criminal and civil complaints, she was able to
document both empowering and disempowering aspects of the
strategy of trying to use the legal system. GettingJustice and Getting Even (1990) shows that most individuals who take their
problems to lawyers and courts seek power. They attempt to
enlist the law and the state on their side: "They go to court
because they see legal institutions as helpful and themselves as
entitled to that help" (ibid., p. 2). Recourse to court is a last
resort for most individuals, but they still believe that the courts
will ultimately be helpful in redressing a wrong. These individuals' "legal consciousness" leads them to believe that their
rights have been invaded and that the judicial system is therefore available to put the machinery of the state in motion to
enforce those legal rights.
These quests for empowerment, however, have "paradoxical consequences" for Merry's litigants (ibid., p. 2): "[They]
empower... plaintiffs with relation to neighbors and relatives,
but at the same time ...

subject ...

them to the control of the

court" (ibid.). Moreover, "[o]ne risks being stigmatized for appealing to this form of power. And it may not help" (ibid., p.
3). Individuals assert their rights in the hope of gaining crucial
power, but they may be disappointed in practice.
The post-dispute transformation studies provide the setting
for the case studies presented in part III. First, this body of
research from the beginning has illustrated the need to follow
the subtle and not so subtle changes that take place in disputes
as they come in contact with the legal system. Context is crucial, and the course of a lawsuit and its ultimate impact can
change dramatically even through serendipitous events and encounters that take place outside the setting of the litigation.
Second, it is important to provide enough detail to see aspects of both empowerment and control-the paradox of the
encounters with the legal system that Merry describes. Are
there sufficient empowering aspects of class actions to change
in any significant way Bumiller's portrayal of how victims of discrimination are debilitated through the language of the law and
the procedures of the legal system? The critical literature on
the class action has already questioned whether the diversion of
resources and energy into litigation on behalf of an abstract
entity, the class, really helps the ostensible beneficiaries of the
action (Bell 1976). Bumiller's findings from individual proceedings add force to those criticisms and suggest the importance
of attention to the situation of the individual grievants, caught
up in class actions. The language and procedures of the law
may end up transforming the individuals' concerns into alienating and debilitating legal constructs.
Distinctive features of the class action, moreover, make it
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important to sort out the different stories of the class representatives, the class lawyers, and the represented parties (cf.
Tushnet 1987). In contrast to the situations Bumiller and
Merry studied, for example, it is not clear in class action doctrine just whose lawsuit and grievance actually matters and
should matter. Is the key actor or beneficiary supposed to be
individuals, the class, or the lawyers? Many writers have focused attention on the "agency" problems in class action,
meaning the issue of whether the supposed beneficiaries in the
represented class have the opportunity and incentive to see
that their lawyers behave consistent with their interests (Alexander 1991; Coffee 1987; Macey & Miller 1991; Silver 1991).
The problems of collective action make it unlikely that class
members will organize into any kind of entity that could monitor the behavior of "their" lawyers, and it is not clear that class
representatives have either the same interests as the class or
enough incentive themselves to monitor the class lawyers
(Rhode 1982).
The agency problem tends to undermine legal scholars' assessments of the importance of class representatives (Bums
1990; Chayes 1982; Kane 1987; Macey & Miller 1991; Minow
1991). In support of a weak or nonexistent role for class representatives, scholars argue that the class ought in any event to
take precedence over representatives who are charged, after
all, with protecting the class interests. Furthermore, as proponents of the abolition of the class representative argue, it is by
no means clear that the class representatives have any real significance in the conduct or even the bringing of the lawsuit.
The key players, according to this argument, are the class attorneys, themselves acting as private attorneys general to enforce
laws on behalf of the class.
A key distinction therefore is lawyer-initiated versus clientinitiated class actions. Such a distinction allows the analysis of
transformations and empowerment as they relate to the person
or entity that turned a potential or actual dispute into a federal
class action. In addition, it is useful to distinguish between different substantive areas and different types of attorneys. The
employment discrimination cases not only provide a nice comparison with the work of Bumiller but also tend to have more
active class representatives than the other class actions. Class
actions with more passive class representatives tend to be
either those brought by a legal aid or public interest organization on behalf of their general clientele or actions brought by
entrepreneurial attorneys who tend to give considerable attention to the fees the lawsuits can generate. While there is considerable variety in the class action case studies, these distinctions
tend to color how the dispute is affected by and affects class
representatives, class members, and class attorneys, each of
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whom can be seen to be empowered (or not) by aspects of the

class action.

II. The Class Action Study
The empirical study on which this article is based sought to
explore the dynamics of dispute transformation as found in
"certified" federal class actions closed in the Northern District
of California from 1979 to 1984.2 My collaborators, Ilene
Nagel and Jay Plager, and I personally interviewed 43 plaintiffs'
lawyers involved in 37 out of the 46 class action "clusters"cases grouped together in the court-found in that district, and
we also questioned 26 class representatives in person or by telephone. 3 Finally, we collected information on the 67 uncertified class actions brought during the same period. 4 The resulting data set provides a rich picture of the era when class actions
were much more common than they are today. 5
The certified class actions involved the following legal
claims: 21 employment discrimination; 5 securities regulation;
5 social security; 4 antitrust; 2 housing eviction and relocation;
2 jails and detention; and 7 others listed in Table 1. Table 1
also summarizes the basic breakdown in terms of legal aid versus private attorneys. The federally subsidized legal aid organizations accounted for 17 of the 46 certified class actions. In addition, Table 1 provides information about the activity of the
2 We used printouts from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to identify
all cases in which the complaint designated the case as a class action. Lawyers filing
class actions were supposed to verify that Federal Rule 23 applied to their case. We
undoubtedly missed a few cases where the class action box was not checked or where
the decision to proceed as a class action was made after the complaint was filed. We
surveyed all the court deputies to obtain names of other class actions, which turned up
a few otherwise unknown to us. We also found numerous cases designated as class
actions that were in fact other types of cases, most notably asbestos litigation or student
loan collections. We went through the docket sheets of all identified class actions
"closed" during 1979-84 to determine whether they had been certified. We then
sought interviews with respect to each certified case. "Certified" means simply that the
judge, pursuant to Federal Rule 23, determined that the filed case could in fact be
deemed a class action.
3 In 22 cases we were able to talk to lawyers and class representatives. Interviews
took place in the summers of 1984 and 1985. They followed a detailed questionnaire.
We also collected and copied the essential documents in the court files of the class
actions. Class representatives were extremely difficult to find. Their addresses are not
written in court pleadings, and old addresses offer few leads in any event. We located
the class representatives by hiring a skip-tracer to find them. Skip-tracers are firms that,
on a contingent-fee basis, specialize in locating individuals. They serve mainly a clientele of creditors.
4 The uncertified cases were ones that were filed as class actions but did not succeed in winning approval from the court to proceed on that basis. We obtained copies
of the docket sheets of all the uncertified cases, but we did not conduct any interviews.
5 Class actions filings peaked in 1976 at 3,584, then declined steadily to 988 in
1984, and have remained under 1,000 per annum since then. See Annual Report of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, summarized in Figure 9 of Donohue & Siegelman (1991:1020). The number was 647 in 1989 and 922 in 1990. Administrative Office
of the United States Courts 1991:311-12.
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Table 1. Certified Class Actions in the Northern District of California,

1979-1984, by Activity, Class Representative, Type of Attorney,
and Case Category

Active Class
Representative?a

Yes

No

?

Yes

Employment discrimination

4

0

0

13

Welfare and social security

1

5

0

-

Securities fraud
Antitrust
Otherb

-

-

-

-

-

-

3

3

All
(N=46)

Private Attorney
(N= 29)

Legal Aid
(N= 17)

1

1
1
2

?

Yes

No

?

0

4

17

0

4

-

-

1

5

0

1
1
5

3
2
4

1
1
1

No

3
2
1

1
1
0

6
6
25
14
7
8
8
1
17
Total
a Activity for the purpose of this table means a continuing active involvement beyond
securing the aid of a lawyer. The activity of going to a lawyer is discussed in the text.
b Legal aid cases in this category included two cases about housing eviction and one
each on jail and detention, retirement benefits, Native American rights, auto towing,
and public employment. Private cases concerned mental health rights, discrimination
in hotel facilities, and jail.

class representative. In sum, Table 1 confirms the major categories of class actions and the different roles of the three potential constituencies. In employment discrimination cases,
whether brought by legal aid or for-profit attorneys, the class
representative tends to be active. Legal aid lawyers tend to
have passive clients in social security and analogous cases,
while entrepreneurial lawyers have relatively passive clients in
the securities and antitrust cases that typify the profit-making
class action practice. This pattern from the cases studied as a
whole is borne out generally in the nine case studies reported
here, which were selected both to exemplify the categories and
to illustrate the richness of the class actions studied.

II. Class Actions Exemplified
The cases are organized into three categories. The first category consists of cases that are mainly the responsibility of a
legal service organization with minimal clientele involvement.
The second set of cases are those of entrepreneurial lawyers
and passive clients. The third category is characterized by individual plaintiffs taking initiative and staying involved. This last
category is exemplified by employment discrimination cases,
three of which will be described, and by a few other cases in
which aggrieved individuals are the initial motivating force.
While this section will not devote as much space to employment discrimination as the numbers would justify, the selections and a few examples from the larger data set will illustrate
the basic themes.
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A. Category A: Organizational Efforts with Incidental Clientele
Case 1. Overpayments of Unemployment Compensation

Social welfare class actions typify those in which the source
of the action is the legal services office itself and not any particular plaintiff. In one case, for example, a legal services program
became aware through its clientele that a number of unemployed persons during the recession at the time had received
payments after their eligibility period had expired. Program
lawyers recognized that under federal regulations, the recipients could be required to repay the amounts they received.
While under existing California state programs, individuals
who received such payments through no fault of their own were
not required to repay the surplus, the U.S. Department of Labor had taken the position in a regulation that state law would
not apply to the special federal supplementary program. The
Labor Department began to require repayment.
The legal services lawyers had seen the issue before. They
had participated in a successful lawsuit about this question with
respect to a similar program. Indeed, in the earlier lawsuit they
had not only stopped the practice, arguing that such a federal
regulation was invalid, but had also succeeded in obtaining retrospective relief. Those who had repaid had been given the
right to recover what they had reimbursed. According to the
lawyer involved in the lawsuit on the supplementary program,
"[we] saw the same cases coming in on this other program and
decided why not go for a nationwide class for this one, and we
did" (Int. 30:4).6 The legal aid lawyers decided to file a class
action for "effectiveness": "if we were going to put in the time
challenging a regulation like this .... we had to have a class
action.... Otherwise 99% of the people affected would not get

any benefit out of the lawsuit." The class representatives were
recruited by other legal aid lawyers who were part of an "informal network" of legal aid programs. According to the lead lawyer, "I never talked to either of the representatives" (Int.
30:12). The class representatives were simply passive recruits.
The result in court and in the legislature was in many respects quite successful. While the earlier lawsuit, supported by
lobbyists from the United Auto Workers and the AFL-CIO, galvanized congressional change, Congress had neglected to
change the program involved in the second lawsuit. Legal aid
lawyers involved in the new case, however, "went back to Congress . . .and . . .got the same change done for this program

the next year. And it was because of all our involvement" (Int.
6 The notation refers to the lawyer interview for case No. 30 in our sample, p. 4.
3

If we had two interviews for the same case, one would be 0a, the other 30b. Interviews
with class representatives are "Rep. Int.," using otherwise the same notation.
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30:6). As a result, the lawsuit came to focus on the retrospec-7
tive relief. Since through the mechanism of a "related case,"
the lawyers were able to get this case before the same judge
who had earlier supported a retroactive remedy, they were successful again on this issue. They won on summary judgment
and then prevailed again on appeal.
Nevertheless, the lawyer reported that the lawsuit was only
about 75% effective. Outside of California, the lawyers were
unable to get anyone to put pressure on the program's state
administrators to reevaluate penalized individuals for the retroactive remedy. Neither the UAW nor legal services offices
outside California pushed for the remedy. The lawyers concluded that this aspect of the case was, "at best, marginally effective" (Int. 30:22). The attorneys had requested and been
awarded fees to monitor the result, but they could not mobilize
persons outside California to ask for overpayments already returned, which made them wonder whether a nationwide class
action "had really been a good idea" (Int. 30:23). The lawyers
engaged in successful advocacy in several forums, but the litigation gained only a relatively small amount of retrospective
relief.
Case 2. Disability Payment Terminations

A similar example was a case in which a plaintiff began the
process. He came to a legal aid office "outraged" (Int. 43:2)
because of a cutoff in social security disability payments. According to the lawyer who handled the subsequent case, "[w]e
spotted constitutional issues" (Int. 43:2), and "once we got one
class representative ...

then we started looking around for cli-

ents from other offices and basically sent out questionnaires.... [W]e had three or four new candidates and from that

we chose one or two" (Int. 43:4). To plan and coordinate the
litigation, the legal services lawyers contacted lawyers "around
the country" and met with several welfare rights organizations
(Int. 43:5), although they kept this class action limited to California. Meanwhile, the individuals named as class representatives received hearings that made their own problems moot.
Under class action doctrine, however, the mootness of their
claims did not stop the action on behalf of the class. Whatever
role individuals played in bringing the problem to the surface,
therefore, they had virtually nothing more to do with the case
or the problems that generated it.
The class action continued, and it changed shape dramatically as it progressed: "the case started out as a kind of deprivation of property without process and then turned into during
7 At the time a filing of a related case petition could facilitate the transfer of a new
case to a judge handling a "related case."
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a much different type of case"

(Int. 43:2). At first the lawyers thought that there had been a
deprivation without notice and a hearing, but in fact notice had
not been omitted. The lawyers shifted their focus to the wording and language of the notice that was in fact sent out. The
class lawyers redefined the problem as the "relatively low
number of recipients who received hearings [who] exercised
their right to counsel... [or] to receive aid pending the resolution of their claim ....

I just thought that the notice was a little

complex and it was difficult for them to understand it" (Int.
43:3).
The case shifted to the content of the notice, and that is
where it ended. The document detailing the terms of settlement of the case thus stated: "The parties have now reached a
class settlement which entails the adoption and use of a new
notice and appeal form in the SSI program." The result was a
nationwide change in at least the form used to instruct individuals of their rights. The lawyer could not say, however, whether
the change affected the number of claimants who exercised
their rights to counsel, to pending benefits, or to a hearing, or
whether hearings or counsel led to more resources for beneficiaries; but the class action did at least gain a remedy in response to the lawyer's assertion that the wording of notice was
too complex.
B. Category B: Entrepreneurial Lawyer with Passive Clients
Case 3. Retail Price Fixing

In the next category of cases, the client is essentially a small
investor in the lawsuit. The antitrust cases in general fit this
category, and two examples are discussed here. The first case
began (at least from the lawyers' perspective) when one of the
law office workers read about a grand jury investigation into
price fixing among retail stores. She reported her discovery to
the lawyers, and the law firm sprang into action. According to
one attorney, "I sent someone down to get a hold of the government statements . . . [and] we retyped the complaint the

government filed" (Int. 1 la:2). The office worker became one
class representative, but she had not really purchased much
from the upscale stores involved. To find other representatives,
the lawyers asked themselves "who would know somebody who
would have had enough money to have [shopped at the
stores]," and they decided to call their "mother's friends" and
evidently a few others (Int. 1 la:4). Quick action made the law
firm one of the first to get a stake in the action, and it continued
to play a major role as other firms with their own clients
maneuvered to get into the action as well.
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In contrast to the social welfare cases, the class representatives in this case did not stay completely out of the controversy
in court. Aggressive defendants took their depositions, as one
class lawyer stated, in order "to get the plaintiffs to say dumb
things" (Int. 1 la:6). Such a tactic is not unusual as a means to
fight class certification in these kinds of cases. But the attorneys
ran the show, surviving a lengthy litigation that finally
culminated in a negotiated settlement that provided damages
to at least the charge customers of the stores. Damage remedies ranged from very small to around $20,000, according to
the lawyers. Lawyers also received court-awarded fees from the
defendants (although they did not feel that they were adequately compensated for their time).
The perspective of two of the class representatives in the
action is interesting. The original one, still very close to the
attorneys in the case, reported that her involvement was limited
to the deposition and a $7 credit on her bill. Another class representative, a lawyer herself, was recruited for the class action
as a friend of the lawyers; and she reported that the class lawyer
did not keep her informed, was not frank about what the lawsuit involved, and kept stating that it would be over soon.
While she received $200, she said that "it all seems stupid
when all is said and done" (Rep. Int. 1 la:2). Neither of these
plaintiffs received much beyond a very small return on the investment and the trouble of a deposition. The lawyers took the
case, ran the show, and got some remedy and some fees.
Case 4. Price Fixing to Distributors
The same was essentially true of another price-fixing case,
handled by a law firm that specialized in antitrust class actions.
In contrast to many major class action cases, 8 and even the one
mentioned before, this case did not attract the attention of the
national antitrust bar: "This was a regionalized case. It involved only alleged anticompetitive activity in the San Francisco area" (Int. 37b:3).
The class attorneys picked up the case as a referral from the
state attorney general's office, which had been investigating
price fixing among certain distributors of a product sold to
consumers. In the lawyer's words, "Generally what happens is,
if the government indicts, either you personally represent a client over a period of time that you have done work for or there
are a number of business lawyers who refer clients to antitrust
people" (Int. 37b:5). This time the client was referred directly
by the government, which also sent the lawyer a copy of the
8 We omitted from our analyses the class actions transferred under 28 U.S.C.
1407 to the multidistrict litigation panels, and therefore we did not study some of the
major national class actions.
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government complaint. Other clients came from the lawyer's
past associations: "I called [client's name] and said, "Hey....
there's another lawsuit. You want to get involved?" (Int.
37b:9).
Another lawyer picked up the same claim simultaneously,
leading to consolidation of the two cases. He reported that at
the place where he shopped for convenience goods, the proprietor, aware of the lawyer's work in antitrust, showed him the
newspaper article about the state investigation. The proprietor
noted that he was a victim of the practices under challenge.
The lawyer took the case and also invited in clients he had represented in other cases (Int. 37a:4). Plaintiff involvement again
seems to have been limited to their depositions as part of the
defendants' attack on class certification.
It is not clear whether this case actually resulted in any
changed practices. The clients again received small sums from
a negotiated settlement, but the one class representative we
were able to talk to openly did not find a change in practice
(even though the state also secured some injunctive relief earlier) (Int. 37b: 19; Rep. Int. 30:2). The lawyers received 25% of
the settlement in damages. The result again was simply that the
case added a damage component to a government antitrust
case. The lawyers pursued such cases as part of their legal business, and the class representatives served essentially as means
to complete the process started by the government claim.
There is evidence that securities class actions generally follow the same model as the antitrust cases just described, except
that the attorneys tend to move into action after certain publicized events that involve corporations and affect the value of
securities (Alexander 1991; Borden 1989). We were unable to
gain access to the lawyers who filed the one case in the Northern District that seemed most to resemble the securities class
actions filed more typically elsewhere in the country. Except for
the case described below, the securities class actions in the
Northern District tended to have plaintiffs who took some initiative to get the cases underway but then did not take other action. They were not merely draftees, but they in effect assigned
their claim to an attorney and left it there.
C. Category C: Energetic and Active Plaintiffs
The employment discrimination class actions tell very different stories. The class representatives confirm Bumiller's
convincing showing that it is not costless to bring a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination (Bumiller 1988; Lanoue &
Lee 1987). It takes remarkable initiative and some anger. Further, the notion of an individual seeking personal empowerment through law, which Merry develops (1990), fits these class
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actions much better than does the typical social security or antitrust action. Three cases will show how these cases can work for
or against such individuals.
Case 5. Hispanic Complaints against an Employment Test

One class action involved a Hispanic challenge to screening
and testing for municipal employment. The particular defendant had already settled actions based on race and gender discrimination. According to the named class representative, he
applied for an opening in the transportation field and was not
even allowed to take the test: "They wanted blacks, not Latinos" (Rep. Int. 40:1). Thirty-five potential test takers, most of
them union members, got together at a restaurant and decided
to seek a lawyer. Several then went to a public interest lawyer
on the basis of the lawyer's "reputation for class actions and
minority representation" (Rep. Int. 40:1).
According to the lawyer, who also was Hispanic, the defendant "had already been hit once or twice. Unfortunately it
hadn't been hit by Hispanic plaintiffs nor had Hispanics intervened in the other cases so that in a sense we saw it as part of
the enforcement of Title VII" (Int. 40:5). The plaintiff group
remained active throughout the course of the suit. They collected information and kept in contact with the attorneys for
the class. The plaintiff group, in addition, was aided by the activities of the few Hispanics who already had succeeded in obtaining the desired employment. The lawyers had little difficulty in negotiating a consent decree, which allowed Hispanics
to circumvent the random process that had prevented all but a
few from taking the relevant test. Later, when some flunked the
test, the lawyers were able to negotiate for tutorial classes to try
to improve the passage rate.
The class representatives were allowed to take the test, and
the defendant pledged affirmative action to bring in others.
The original plaintiff got a job and was happy with the result:
"The main thing was to break through.... [The defendant] got
the message" (Rep. Int. 40:2). And the plaintiff's actions did
not lead to acrimony: "Everyone sues [the defendant] ... to get

a piece of the action." At the time of the interviews, the plaintiff
group continued to meet and stay involved with the issues that
surrounded the lawsuit.
According to the public interest attorney, the action was
not successful in advancing very many Hispanics. Class members who were active in the group were "frustrated" because
"they couldn't see why we couldn't get more .

.

. and .

.

. we

[did a] lot of explaining.., how there was a limitation and how
we couldn't just get them all positions" (Int. 40:15). A combination of the economic downturn and the impact of Proposi-
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tion 13 in California, in addition, meant that there were layoffs
rather than substantial new hiring. The defendant, according to
the attorney, was still "30% to 35% under what [it] should be"
(Int. 40:10). The public interest attorney secured some fees for
the public interest organization and a remedy in court consistent with general aims, but the case by itself did not succeed
fully in furthering the aim of more Hispanics in public employment.
Case 6. Employment Discrimination against Blacks in Retail Sales

A second example-a highly contested class action-began
with a black man who believed that he had been passed over for
promotions in a department store, with the positions instead
filled by white men hired "off the streets" (Rep. Int. 38a:1). He
filed a grievance with the EEOC and secured a right to sue letter, and he then contacted an individual known to him as a
"class action lawyer." The lawyer reported that he asked the
potential plaintiff if anyone else was in the same situation, and
the result was the addition of another named plaintiff. The second plaintiff had also filed with the EEOC, but the defendant
had refused to accommodate him. The grievance had remained, but it had stalled: "his was a kind of dead issue" (Int.
38:5).
The attorney asked the plaintiffs to "give me some figures"
on the statistics of employment in the higher status positions,
"[s]o one of them got hold of the store's EEO report . ..
which showed . . . a very low number of blacks in big ticket

[sales] and in division management" (Int. 38:6). The lawyer decided to try to make a statistical case for all the stores in California, but eventually the judge simply cut the class to most of
the stores in the Bay Area. The original plaintiff, according to
the lawyer, tried to recruit plaintiffs from another store where
he knew some black employees, but "he found a lot of intimidated people who did not want to get involved, so he gave up"
(Int. 38:10).
As the case progressed, one of the original plaintiffs was
fired by the defendant. His marriage broke up and "he looked a
wreck. He was a wreck" (Int. 38:11). Nevertheless, that plaintiff
reported that, when it was over, he was satisfied with the result
"to a large degree" (Rep. Int. 38b: 2). He did have complaints.
Seven years was too long. The defendant had changed only in
its "public face." He had been unable to get a job for six years
because of the derogatory remarks made about him by the defendant, and part of the settlement was that he would not fight
for reinstatement. He did, however, receive substantial monetary damages. The other named plaintiff thought the result was
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a real change in the behavior of the defendant, and he also received money damages (Rep. Int. 38a:2).
The actual consent decree provided for goals and timetables a little better than those already on record with the
EEOC, and it also reiterated the situation at the time of the
decree and what needed to be done. Clearly there had already
been considerable change during the course of the lawsuit. As
part of the negotiations for a settlement, the attorney agreed to
a cap on the fees. The cap on fees was accepted because of a
need for a settlement: "The statistical proof was not all that
solid, as we had problems with the data itself down to the very
end" (Int. 38:21). How much the case actually accomplished
for the class is therefore difficult to determine.
Case 7. Sex Discrimination in Employment Promotions
A third employment discrimination began in roughly the
same fashion. Two black women brought a claim to an attorney. The attorney filed a class action alleging both race and sex
discrimination. After a year, with class certification still highly
contested, the attorney contacted a more experienced class action litigator, stating, "I'm on to a big case and I don't have the
resources to handle it" (Int. 36:6). The attorney who then took
the case noted that it was unique in that it had "highly placed
plaintiffs," with the class members in professional and managerialjob classifications (Int. 36:5). The new attorney felt that the
class action needed shoring up with a new class representative
"in a higher job position" (Int. 36:7), and he found that another woman had an existing but probably dormant claim on
file with the EEOC. He described her as a "very, very powerful
woman" (Int. 36:9). She did agree to join the case as a class
representative.
As in the previous cases, the attorney obtained a copy of the
company's "fairly extensive affirmative action plan" (Int. 36:6)
and through discovery secured "a complete data base" to see
the extent to which women and blacks were underrepresented
(Int. 36:9). The attorney found a mixed story: "we fell completely short on blacks." With respect to claims based on gender, they found some respectable claims (Int. 36:9); "there
were some pockets of nondiscrimination where women exceeded any theory of availability we could muster, and we just
carved that out of the class." The attorney ultimately elected
simply to eliminate the racial discrimination claims, and the
certified class action and subsequent settlement concerned
only sex discrimination.
The individual class representatives received separate monetary settlements. It does not appear that they were very happy
with the results. One of the original plaintiffs thought she
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should have received more, but the attorney was convinced that
her $5,000 or so was 100% of what the claim was worth (Int.
36:13). Another class representative expressed concern about

the case in a letter to the judge: "there is one detail that the
consent decreedoes not actually address ....

[A] named plain-

tiff's original complaint raised the issue of race discrimination.
Somehow, during the litigation of this lawsuit that issue was
eliminated." A back-pay fund of $325,000 was also created for
class members asserting claims. Finally, in addition to attorney's fees, the settlement mandated injunctive relief and a reporting requirement for monitoring: "They had an affirmative
action plan, so they committed to that principle. It was a matter
of getting the numbers up to where I thought they should be"
(Int. 36:16). The attorney, our only informant about the case,
thought that the goals and timetables were being met by the
defendant.
Case 8. Antitrust versus a PrepaidPlan
Outside the civil rights area, there are also several examples
of relatively active class representatives. One case concerned a
medical practitioner who had been quite unhappy with a prepaid medical plan that he believed had been interfering in the
patient-doctor relationship (Rep. Int. 23:1). He became active
with a group of like-minded practitioners who formed an organization. The organization spent three years trying to gain
control of the prepaid plan by campaigning for political office
in the prepaid system, but the efforts failed. According to the
principal activist, "then I lost interest," and it "was a dead issue" (Rep. Int. 23:1).
Four or five years later, someone in the organization talked
with a specialist in malpractice who expressed interest in such a
case. The malpractice lawyer then put the original leader in
touch with a law firm in Northern California, which thought
that the facts might amount to price fixing in violation of the
antitrust laws. The idea, according to the original leader, was to
be out of the "political" struggle while letting the courts decide
legal issues. He and his group helped put together a list from
which the class representatives were picked, and they raised
$10,000 to $20,000 in costs for the litigation (not for attorney's
fees, which were to be covered by a contingent fee).
The "legal" strategy as politics of last resort left the lawyers
in control. The action was brought for money damages, not injunctive relief. According to the antitrust lawyer for the plaintiffs, "in order for me to get paid I had to collect money damages and yet what they were most interested in was injunctive
relief. . .: I was not going to bring it as an injunctive action
unless they would pay me by the hour" (Int. 23:13). After the

254

The Federal Class Action

class was certified, several legal precedents made it appear
more difficult to prevail on the merits. In settlement negotiations, therefore, according to the class lawyer, he said to the
defendant, "Well, change some of these prices and pay my
[W]e got
fees, and so that's what ultimately happened .....
changes that we could live with" (Int. 23:15) and more than
$300,000 in attorney's fees.
According to the original named plaintiff, the settlement
was "no victory at all." He was "not convinced at the time that
the firm was right in settling," but they had worked hard and
"were anxious to get at least their fees" (Rep. Int. 23:2). The
political struggle was left just where it had been before the case
was filed.
Case 9. Securities Fraudin a Business Acquisition

A securities fraud action had the same kind of fortuitous
beginning. One of the about 50 shareholders in a small corporation opposed its acquisition by a much larger enterprise. The
shareholder, who helped operate the business with the other
shareholders, was quite angry, and "it festered in his mind for
quite a while" (Int. 15:6). He tried to cash in some of the shares
he had been provided as part of the acquisition, and the sales
transactions took more time than he expected. Finally, he asked
informally for advice from his next-door neighbor, a securities
lawyer, who saw a potential securities violation in the facts
presented to him. The lawyer thought of a class action and
asked the shareholder "to develop a cadre" of class representatives. The shareholder was able to provide five more individuals to serve as class representatives, and the class action therefore sought rescission of the acquisition. Not only did they sue
the acquiring company, but the plaintiffs also insisted on expressing their anger by naming the directors as defendants.
Every aspect of the case was vigorously contested, but the class
was certified by the court and proceeded to trial. And as the
naming of the defendants illustrates, for these parties the lawsuit was part of a political struggle.
After four weeks of trial, the class representatives "were
wearing . . . down emotionally" (Int. 15:19), and "they were
losing pay." A few days before the plaintiffs were scheduled to
rest the case and four years after the initial pleading, in the lawyer's words, "my people disintegrated as a class" (Int. 15:19).
The lawyer stated convincingly, moreover, that there was a sudden change more dramatic than simply an attrition over time in
the plaintiffs' resolve.
The defendant made an offer that would have been completely unacceptable before, but only the original named plaintiff, now terminally ill, was willing to oppose it. The other class
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representatives forced acceptance of the settlement in the next
few days exactly as offered. The settlement involved the payment of some money to the plaintiffs and about $150,000 in
attorney fees, but the lawyer opposed it. He felt that the case
was worth much more and that he "lost a half a million dollars"
that he would have received for winning the suit (Int. 15:27).
Why did the plaintiffs capitulate? The attorney did not know
for sure, but he argued convincingly that some kind of undue
pressure was put on the class representatives by the opponents
of the case. The pressure, he felt, made several key class representatives unwilling to continue the litigation. The case ended
for reasons that had nothing to do with the merits of the litigation. It began and ended as part of a political struggle that was
changed somewhat, but not completely, by class action litigation.
IV. Class Actions and Empowerment: Critical Insights
A. Narrowing
The examples confirm the general insight of the dispute
transformation literature: litigation tends to narrow the dispute
that gave rise to it. The cases described above and the others in
the study suggest that the translation into the language of the
law necessarily eliminates much of the richness of disputes.
The expiration of unemployment benefits in a recession
moves from an attack on the reimbursement of overpayments
to a case about a retroactive remedy (case 1). A long-term
struggle about control of a prepaid insurance group becomes
framed as a narrow antitrust issue (case 8). A fight about power
and fairness among 50 shareholders in a close-knit corporation
becomes, for a time at least, a question of compliance with securities laws (case 9). The employment discrimination cases become mainly questions of statistics, moving from the complaints of individuals to whatever items are supported by
aggregate statistics (cases 6 and 7). Other securities and antitrust cases seem to represent only pieces of a governmental investigation that already defined the legal and factual cases
(cases 3 and 4). A winnowing of social security disability claimants becomes a contest about the adequacy of the wording of
the notice (case 2).
The last example is particularly noteworthy, since the legal
issue became a variant of notice and the right to be heard. Indeed, due process is the lawyers' theme in the class actions that
involve almost any question except securities, antitrust, or employment discrimination. In addition to the case already described, other welfare cases focused on the question of a hearing, an attack on jail conditions focused on punishments of
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detainees without some due process, another case attacked detention without some hearing, and another concerned car towing without some notice. The lawyers showed a marked tendency to search for a due process theory to shore up the legal
theory of the case (see Chambers & Wald 1985). At the time of
these cases, lawyers spoke and courts heard only one basic constitutional phrase: the right to notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
B. Political Expansion
The narrowing of the dispute into legally recognizable
terms appears on the surface inconsistent with an expansive
model of the class actions, but the inconsistency is deceptive.
One way to see power being gained from class actions is in the
opportunity it offers to expand individual disputes into group
actions, mobilizing a group that will develop into an independent force for change. While the claim itself may narrow in the
process, it can still serve as a focal point for the mobilization of
a group (e.g., Simon 1984:469, 488, 489). If such mobilization
does not occur, it may be that the political activity is on the
whole reduced (Paul-Shaheen & Perlstadt 1982). Potential
group action could become sidetracked into a long, lawyerdominated court proceeding.
The class actions in this study provide no evidence that the
conscientious class attorney uses the class action as an organizing tool to build an activist class. Politically sensitive lawyers
might of course take the time and energy to recruit and organize class members into some form of organization, but nothing
in the class actions we studied reveals any evidence of it or any
particular incentive or strategic reason to do so. This legal device as a practical matter does nothing for the lawyer as organizer.
Two dimensions of power-dispute expansion and group
mobilization-support the conclusion that political empowerment has very little to do with class actions. So far, however, we
have neglected to assess the accomplishments of the class actions at the more mundane level. We must ask who gets what
from class action litigation in terms of legal remedies for legal
violations.
C. Agency Issues and the Evaluation of Client Empowerment in
Class Actions
The complications of agency in the context of class actions
suggest that outcomes will not have the same client scrutiny
that is given to outcomes in ordinary civil litigation. Class action lawyers, in the first place, are charged with a duty of para-
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mount loyalty to the class, not the class representatives. Accordingly, a settlement or litigated outcome that provides some
benefits for the class but little for the class representatives cannot be challenged effectively by the persons who generally have
shown the most interest in the case. And if class representatives
are treated well, that reduces further their incentive to scrutinize what the class members obtain. Class members do not as a
rule have a great individual stake in the action, and therefore
they have little incentive to monitor the case (assuming that
they even know about it). The class lawyers have the most direct interest in the outcome of the case, but they also have a
conflict to the extent that they need to collect their fees
through the litigation (see Coffee 1987; Macey & Miller 1991)
or accomplish the general aims of a legal aid or public interest
organization.
The descriptions provided in this article and the other cases
in this study provide a number of examples in which the class
representatives do not get much from the class action litigation. In two categories of cases, class representatives are virtually meaningless: they are enlisted on behalf of public interest
or private entrepreneurial attorneys. If we limit ourselves to the
more active representatives, we can still find some relatively
sad stories. One of the plaintiffs challenging promotions in retail sales (case 6) was fired and could not find a job for six
years. He received damages but was persuaded not to push for
reinstatement. Still more notable was the plaintiff who complained that the original complaint alleged race discrimination
in promotional practices (case 7) but that the case settled only
on the question of gender discrimination. Another case, not
discussed above, led to a settlement of the claim for race discrimination, but the original class representative never got the
promotion that he originally sought (Rep. Int. 18:2). And in
another settled case involving race discrimination in employment, the original plaintiff was fired by a bank, was "not allowed to testify," and was left only with "the satisfaction that I
was doing the right thing" (Rep. Int. 19:2). Many class representatives did receive special relief in employment discrimination actions, but some ended up with no tangible benefit from
the settlement of the claim.
Turning to the benefits provided to the class, the facts do
not add up to a strong picture of litigation that makes lasting
improvements in the lives of class members. As noted before, it
is never easy to evaluate negotiated settlements without a very
good idea of the posture of the judge, the available facts, and
the legal snapshot at the time of negotiations; but it is worth
providing some critical scrutiny of the cases described in this
article.
Two of the three antitrust cases (cases 3, 4, and 8) essen-
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tially had no class representatives, and all three had lawyers
who needed to get fees from the settlement. The two that derived from governmental investigations needed no injunctive
relief, and the result was simply a damage remedy, distributed
with some difficulty, and attorney's fees. The third, which had
picked up belatedly on a long struggle over third-party payment to physicians in a prepaid insurance group, resulted explicitly in a few changes in practice in order to justify a settlement and attorney's fees. The original plaintiff, who did
monitor the solution, found it to be "no victory at all" for him
or the class. The securities case (case 9) was a case where the
plaintiffs and class gained power through the class action, but
they only succeeded in bringing on extralegal power that compelled them to settle the case. There was, however, a substantial damage component and some attorney's fees.
The employment discrimination cases (cases 5, 6, and 7)
are different in that injunctive relief is a basic feature, but these
cases also can be scrutinized critically for the benefits brought
to the class. The Hispanic challenge to a test succeeded in making more of the positions available to Hispanics. The economic
downturn prevented dramatic results, but the case was by and
large successful in accomplishing the purpose shared by the
plaintiffs and lawyer. The other two cases went from unhappy
plaintiffs to statistical analyses to whatever consent decrees
could be justified by the statistics. Funds were created by the
defendant to compensate victims of discrimination. And for the
future the defendants committed themselves to goals and timetables based largely on affirmative action plans already agreed
to in principle with the EEOC. The commitment of the consent
decree gave more bite to the affirmative action plans, but we
cannot know whether there would have been the same effort to
comply in any event. One could say these cases, all told, enhanced access to a test, not a job, and aided affirmative action
mainly by reaffirming existing plans.
Finally, two social welfare cases brought by legal aid organizations (cases I and 2) were victories, but the results are again
ambiguous. The first case helped gain the attention of Congress so that it changed the rule about overpayments of certain
unemployment benefits, but Congress might have done that
under pressure from another labor union initiative anyway; and
the winning of retroactive relief did not lead to action outside
California even though it was a nationwide class action. The
attack on the hearing before the cutoff of disability ended with
a change in the language of the notice, but we cannot know
whether the notice did anything to cause more hearings or
fewer cutoffs. Indeed, we cannot know whether the numerous
other class actions that settled for notice or a hearing had any
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substantial impact-for example, on the towing of cars in San
Francisco or the infliction of punishment on jail inmates.
This negative analysis is of course unduly one-sided even
on its own terms. There were some very striking legal victories
among the 46 cases we studied. Still, the cases do not add up to
a very convincing argument for the class action as a significant
tool of empowerment or social change. The results, evaluated
in terms of group mobilization or the achievements of the litigation itself, are not overwhelming. This does not mean that
plaintiffs deserved better outcomes in individual instances. Nor
does this analysis speak to the question of whether class action
litigation is socially good according to a number of plausible
criteria. The point is simply that, if we examine the cases from
the perspective of the supposed beneficiaries and a relatively
simple political model, we cannot conclude easily that the class
action form creates a practice of substantial benefit and power
to plaintiffs.
V. Rethinking Empowerment and Class Actions
Given few lawyer-created groups, few unambiguously successful class representatives, and few clear victories for class
members, we could be tempted either to return to "context is
everything," which characterizes most litigation, or to a deep
pessimism about the role of legal artifice in promoting or hindering social change. Dispute transformation in class actions, it
seems, narrows the problem dramatically to get it before the
court, and then the resulting settlements do not even provide
much in the way of legal remedies.
To get a more balanced assessment of empowerment and
results requires a more expansive theoretical perspective. This
perspective builds on the sensitivity to the construction of parties characteristic of the dispute transformation literature in
general and in particular of the works cited by Bumiller and
Merry. According to this perspective, some types of class actions described in the case studies can be seen to result in substantial empowerment. We begin by rethinking what the class
action means for the active class representatives found most
notably in the employment discrimination cases and sprinkled
around the other cases as well. Numerically, indeed, as shown
in Table 1, active class representatives are much more common
than passive recruits, passive investors, or individuals who
bring suit and then move to the sidelines. Next we look at the
cises controlled mainly by entrepreneurial attorneys seeking
their fees as part of the settlement. Our focus here is on the
relatively traditional concerns of access and aggregation, but
there is a more subtle point. We must appreciate the way that
all the kinds of class actions, in part through aggregation, pro-
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vide key litigating advantages typically unavailable to individual
litigants or to lawyers taking on a cause or claim which by itself
lacks the stakes for an exercise in "big litigation."
A. Class Action Representatives: Odd Persons out or Legally
Constructed Activists
We begin with the consequences of the class action for class
representatives. This starting point is not self-evident from the
literature. The literature of the class action questions whether
class representatives ought to be empowered in any special
sense from a lawsuit. A recent article terms them "decorative
figureheads" and calls for their abolition (Burns 1990; Macey &
Miller 1991). One lawyer-interviewee echoed this concern by
stating, "I litigate class actions-individuals are irrelevant"
(Int. 19a). In many class actions this skepticism about class representatives appears very well justified.
The class representative is not in fact very important in the
large-scale, small-claim litigation characteristic of most securities and antitrust class actions (Macey & Miller 1991), which are
brought by entrepreneurial plaintiffs' attorneys. The recruited
plaintiffs serve lawyers only as "their ticket into litigation"
(ibid., p. 117; Burns 1990). Similarly, in the welfare cases the
legal aid organization mounts an attack on a practice affecting
its general constituency. Class representatives here as well are
outside of what is clearly a lawyers' class action.
Beyond those examples, however, the class actions are
often quite relevant to the lives of the class representatives.
And even when a lawyer, as the quotation above indicates,
chooses to make the class representative irrelevant to the litigation, that does not mean such a choice lacks consequences for
the life of the class representative. The active class representatives merit serious attention.
These lawsuits last several years at a minimum. Many of
them-most obviously the employment discrimination casesstart with plaintiffs who are deeply aggrieved. The class action
focuses considerable attention on them within their nonlegal
lives. They are empowered or disempowered there, not simply
in the courtroom, and the course of the litigation affects their
everyday lives. They also may organize-find friends at leastto bolster their own personal or ideological positions. Indeed,
it makes much more sense for them to organize than for their
lawyers to do so.
Our information is not as rich as we would like on the details of ground-level activity during the course of the litigation
(cf. Schuck 1986). We know how most of the cases got started
and what role individuals played in the litigation, but the data
are not as complete on the impact of the lawsuit itself on daily

Garth

261

life and disputing. Some tentative observations can nevertheless be made, beginning with the contrast between the class action and the employment discrimination cases Kristin Bumiller
(1988) examined. She reported, "these respondents resist perceiving their misfortune as the result of their group identity"
(ibid., p. 101), and "It]he ambivalent invocation of the concept
of discrimination stultifies legal action" (ibid., p. 97). The legal
process constructs the victim. The class representatives in the
employment discrimination cases and in other cases where they
asserted themselves, in contrast, seem to have gained some status and strength from their "leadership" of the class action.
The class representative status may help to construct an activist. Moreover, the possibility of multiple plaintiffs in the class
action allowed individuals to team up and support one another.
In some sense their group identity is highlighted (cf. Tushnet
1987:147-50; Yeazell 1987).
The three employment discrimination cases described
above (cases 5, 6, and 7) provide examples. The Hispanic challenge to tests involved about 35 persons who often got together (Rep. Int. 40). The class representative was proud that
he was "not scared" and that he succeeded in winning "a piece
of the action" for Hispanics. In the case concerning promotions in retail sales positions, the class representatives found
crucial information, tried to recruit others, and despite tremendous personal hardship experienced by one of them, still expressed general satisfaction with the result. In the third case, as
noted before, at least one class representative felt that a racial
discrimination claim should not have been eliminated, but the
case began with two women acting together (Int. 36:5), and the
woman the lawyer discovered went from a dormant claimant
taking absolutely no action on her EEOC complaint to a strongly
assertive position in the conflict with the employer.
Indeed, a fascinating feature of the cases is that they revive
claims that might have gone unpursued. It is not inconsistent
with strong plaintiff beliefs to see cases where pure serendipity
seems to have brought lawyer and class representative together
(compare Merry 1990:95). The plaintiff attacking the prepaid
plan had gone years before someone revived his interest by
mentioning that a particular lawyer might be willing to pay attention (case 8). The securities case began with two neighbors
chatting about unfairness "festering" in the mind of one and
the other happened to be a lawyer (case 9). And in at least two
employment discrimination cases, potential class representatives had stopped pushing their claims. The class actions in
many of these cases provide an otherwise unavailable outlet for
grievances going nowhere.
If we go beyond the cases described in some detail, moreover, we can find individuals who, for example, "felt many
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others had suffered" (Rep. Int. 35:1), began a class action after
an informal meeting of a group of women upset with discrimination (Rep. Int. 8a; 8b), or who "wanted a class action from
the beginning" (Rep. Int. 3 1:1). Another black woman took initiative by herself to bring an employment discrimination suit,
then began conversations with individuals who "starting alleging things," so "we asked them to come in [to the litigation] as
well" (Rep. Int. 42:1). The result for her was that she "gained
esteem" and still was thanked often after the lawsuit was over
(Rep. Int. 42:2). And in another case a black woman professional, who required psychological counseling because she felt
mistreated badly by a hotel bar on account of her race, became
emboldened through an evening educational class to seek vindication and won a striking settlement that seems to have confirmed her role as an activist (Rep. Int. 46).
Of course in other cases there was considerable groundlevel activity of a much more hostile nature. One Hispanic class
representative found that while he put himself on the line, the
"worst enemies" were the people at work (Rep. Int. 12:1). He
pushed people to get involved, but the result was that he "lost
lots of friends" (Rep. Int. 12:2). A woman who alleged employment discrimination found the class action decertified by evidence from 30 potential class members who averred that they
felt fairly treated by the company (Int. 9). And one woman in a
social welfare case withdrew as class representative after adverse publicity about the case (Int. 7:2).
In some cases, the class action can be empowering personally and through ground-level activity that occurs along with
the class action. It may also be personally very costly if
whatever status comes with class representative designation is
not met with support at the ground level or, for whatever reason, the class representative later becomes an odd person out
of the litigation. 9 But the opportunity to go on the offensive,
and to gain allies, does seem to be an important feature of class
action practice at the ground level.
B. Aggregation
The subtle and elusive potential empowerment of activist
class representatives contrasts with the relatively straightforward economic idea of access through aggregation (see Alexander 1991; Coffee 1987). There is no question that some of the
cases could not have been brought if the claims of class mem9 Since the class attorney represents the class, not specific flamed plaintiffs, it is
possible to, in effect, ignore the individual claims that began the case. Class action
doctrine for the most part provides no special reward or incentive to class representatives. For the argument, which has considerable merit to it, that there should be rewards, see Greenfield (1986). Blum (1991) describes recent case developments.
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bers were not aggregated through the class action. All three of
the antitrust cases discussed above (cases 3, 4, and 8) fall into
this category, as do the securities cases that have not been discussed in detail.
This general observation about access is hardly surprising.
The antitrust and securities cases tend to bring together a
number of relatively small claims for damages. The amount at
stake, which in practice tends to set the boundaries for the attorney's fees in successful litigation, is raised through aggregation, making cases economically viable when they otherwise
might not be. The cases seeking primarily injunctive relief,
such as the discrimination cases, do not have quite the same
access problems. Enough may be at stake from the defendant's
perspective to justify attorney investment in the hope of courtawarded fees. Moreover, to the extent that there are highly motivated class representatives involved, which is not the rule in
antitrust and securities cases, or ideologically motivated attorneys, such as those from the legal services offices, there may be
less of a threshold to go forward. Nevertheless, the class action
generally makes it easier to justify the expenditure of resources
to bring a complex lawsuit.' 0
This point can be reinforced by reference to the 67 uncertified class actions mentioned earlier but not described. The
cases that were filed as class actions but not certified resembled
generally the mix of cases of the certified class actions: 27 employment discrimination; 8 antitrust; 4 securities regulation; 5
social security; 4 labor concerns; and 13 other civil rights
(which cannot be made more precise from our data set); and 6
others. It is instructive to compare the outcomes generally of
these cases with the certified class actions. First, while it is difficult to discern much detail from the docket sheets, it is clear
that certified class actions in general have more settlement
clout and a greater staying power. As Table 2 indicates, certified class actions were three times as likely as uncertified cases
to go to trial on any aspect of the claim (17% vs. 6%). Three of
the four uncertified cases that were tried involved employment
discrimination claims and the other was a labor dispute. Almost
two-thirds of the uncertified cases ended in summary judgment
for the defendant (22%), simply died or never really got started
(combined as 33% in the table), or were remanded or transferred (9%). While 28% of the uncertified cases resulted in
some form of "settlement," the settlement rate was 78% for
the certified cases. Moreover, some of the settlements in the
uncertified cases probably were tantamount to abandonment;
10 Also, with the federal courts' increasing tendency to channel its "lesser" cases
away from the attention of Article III judges with life tenure, big cases may be necessary to get access to genuine federal judges, not just to the bureaucracy of federal court
(Garth 1988; Resnik 1991).
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and the remaining settlements may have occurred either prior
to a contest on certification, while a certification motion was
pending, or when there were plausible arguments for appeal on
the class action issue.
The contrasting fates of certified and uncertified class actions lead to a further point. Not only does the number of dismissals and abandonments of the uncertified cases suggest that
aggregation is often essential even to access, in both damage
actions and many of the other cases; but also it appears that
aggregation affects the conduct of litigation. Sufficiently high
stakes make available some other notable features of the class
action that may qualify as empowering.
C. Constructing Big Litigation: Making Available the Practice
Tools of the Strong
We have seen how the class action can help to construct an
activist outside of court and how it promotes access by aggregation. Shifting attention to the lawyers who handle such cases
and the positions they tend to represent, we can add that the
class action constructs big-time lawyers for big-time litigation.
This key feature of the class action can be seen by contrasting
high-stakes, big litigation with the cases of ordinary people with
ordinary claims. It is generally accepted that in high-stakes contract litigation, where for one reason or another one side does
not comply with the terms of a contract, lawyers will search the
arcane doctrines of contract law and probe all factual aspects of
the situation to try to find something usable to excuse or justify
the breach. The uranium litigation that followed the oil crisis in
the 1970s well illustrates this phenomenon. The price of uranium went way up, and many suppliers simply refused to deliver according to the terms of their contracts. Enough was at
stake for lawyers to search every possible theory and fact to
avoid the contracts. Similarly, if an individual suffers serious
enough injuries in an accident that can be traced to a deeppocket defendant, the personal injury lawyer will spend extraordinary energy and time to find a plausible story of negligence or a defective product. The Audi invisible accelerator
probably exemplified this effort. The personal injury bar for a
time convinced jurors that Audis simply accelerated on their
own. Studies have shown that Audi cars never had such a defect.
In contrast, as Sally Merry (1990:135) shows, ordinary people have little success in finding a way to make their problems
into actionable legal concerns.
As they spend time in court, plaintiffs discover that the courts
do not take their family and neighborhood problems very seriously. The courts are not eager to handle these problems,
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nor do they regard them as real legal cases. Plaintiffs find that
penalties are rare for the people who have injured them. Nor
is there much sympathy for their plight. Instead, plaintiffs are
told that these are moral problems unworthy of legal attention, that they are themselves at fault to some extent, and that
they need moral advice or counseling rather than the intervention of the law.
While their "legal consciousness" suggests to them that their
rights have been violated, these plaintiffs have no way to invoke
the power of the law unless they happen to have a claim that fits
very narrowly into a legal category recognized by jealous gatekeepers of the state legal system.
Class actions both raise the stakes to justify more effort and
provide a procedural tool for taking a generalized consciousness of a violation of rights-asserted by lawyers or plaintiffsand shaping it toward legally justifiable relief. A review of the
cases discussed earlier well illustrates this point. That is not to
say that the remedies necessarily amount to very much by most
criteria. But the class action allows an intense legal scrutiny,
some probing of the facts, and the possibility of a remedy that
responds in some positive fashion to what intense legal scrutiny
uncovers.
The first case, concerning unemployment benefits, shows
experienced lawyers who knew a good legal theory to stop recoveries of overpayments when the recipients were not at fault
and even found a way to get the case to a judge sympathetic to
the notion of a retroactive remedy. Case 2 started with one theory of the case, a lack of notice, which went nowhere, and
ended up with at least some attention to the content of the notice-a very different approach to the problem of benefit terminations. Cases 3 and 4 do not demonstrate this phenomenon,
since they amount to no more than making defendants pay a
little more for their alleged antitrust violations. Case 5 began
with attention focused on the qualifications for Hispanics to
take an employment test, but it proceeded to consider even the
problem of tutoring to prepare for it. Lawyers shifted around
but kept focused on Hispanic access to the jobs. All three of the
employment discrimination cases show serious scrutiny of the
defendants' practices and composition of the workforce, a shifting of legal theories and even of plaintiffs in order to find a
legal pressure point, and eventually some backpay and a decree
that helped to keep the pressure on. The last two cases did not
accomplish much, but the process of scrutiny and the effort to
find a decent legal theory is consistent with class action litigation generally.
Lawyers are not always very imaginative, sometimes doing
no more than parroting a claim developed by the state or
others or groping for a due process claim with some factual
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basis. The probing of the defendant's conduct varies from case
to case. But the class action allows a serious probe that goes
well beyond the particular situation of one or two plaintiffs, and
the stakes in class actions create an economic incentive to find
some pressure point on which to base a negotiated settlement
and, where relevant, a claim for attorney's fees."I
The class action's power, available to whoever succeeds in
complying with its legal formalities, can be described more precisely. Success in certification makes it possible to raise the
stakes through aggregation, which justifies some greater expenditure of attorney time on the plaintiffs' (and defendants')
side. The hours invested make possible a deep rather than a
superficial settlement. Liberal discovery can be justified by the
stakes and the fact that the scope of class actions justifies a very
wide scope for discovery. The class action quite clearly permits
a shifting of legal theories to whatever seems plausible. Indeed,
even class representatives can be shifted not only to assure certification but also to make a stronger case on the facts.
This use of the legal practice tools of the powerful does
not, any more than in general high-stakes litigation, ensure that
the results are necessarily efficient or that the results are positive in terms of the level and kind of legal regulation that ultimately gets invoked in support of a settlement or litigated outcome. The point, however, is that one generally plausible role
of class actions is to allow those without the resources to invoke
the law on their behalf to hold another party's conduct up to
the more or less intense legal scrutiny (Ackerman 1984; Chayes
1976; Fiss 1979) characteristic of high-stakes litigation. In contrast to the cases Merry (1990) studied, the processes available
for class actions can make some "moral problems" worthy of
serious legal attention.

VI. Concluding Observations
Three general points emerge from this study. First, it seems
fair to say that the class action is a politically empowering legal
artifice, whether or not the results of the class actions actually
bring substantial material resources to classes or class representatives. The inevitable narrowing of disputes and the ambiguity of results reflected in successful settlements leave room
for different interpretations about results; but the class action
at least permits significant empowering both of individuals and
of the lawyers and the classes they represent.
Second, one of the ways power can be generated is by allI Among the 67 uncertified class actions, 15 of the 16 summary judgment terminations were in favor of defendants. Some cases are simply weak on the merits, but a
contributing factor to these results is the reduced economic incentive in the noncertifled class action to invest enough resources for the case to survive summary judgment.
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lowing, through aggregation and the availability of the tools of
high-stakes litigation, a relatively intense legal scrutiny. There
is some disagreement in the legal community about whether
intense legal scrutiny by private party litigants is economically
worth the cost (Garth 1988). On the one hand, the cases did
not uncover very much of great significance about the defendants' behavior, and the costs of litigation were clearly substantial. One could argue that it would be better to leave the defendants free of this scrutiny and instead to let them be
regulated by the market or at times the government. On the
other hand, the threat of scrutiny through class actions certainly deters some behavior, and the certified class action cases
on the whole were fairly strong on the merits.
It is difficult to resolve such an issue about class actions or
about other forms of relatively intrusive litigation. At the very
least, more research would be useful about the way procedural
tools are employed to investigate a defendant, the assessment
of the facts uncovered according to various legal standards and
theories, and decisions to litigate or settle in light of the facts
and law (Kritzer 1991). There is evidence that the attorneys
with passive clients in securities cases tend to settle the litigation with only a superficial investigation into the merits (Alexander 1991). The antitrust cases discussed here (cases 3, 4, and
8) support that point. They do not point to any deepening of
an inquiry through the litigation process beyond what was
known when the cases were filed. On the other hand, highstakes litigants at times do mobilize the full power of big litigation, and the class action helps distribute that power more generally in our society. Whether it is used is an important subject
for research, but it is notable that it can be used.
Finally, the analysis of class actions and the class representatives suggests a way to approach the study of litigation that
supplements the dispute transformation perspective. The analysis invites a richer image than that of a dispute changing form
as it confronts the law and legal procedures. A "gesture from
the court," as Sally Merry (1990:87) notes, produces "symbolic
power" for the individual litigants in her study. The relationship between the gestures of the legal system and litigants'
daily lives should be a focal point of the models that guide research.
One way to envision the relationship, as stated in the introduction, is to imagine an audience watching a dramatization of
some of their daily struggles. The drama expresses the story in
whatever legal language is available, such as due process or discrimination, and that language may shift as the case develops.
The manner of these portrayals affects how the characters in
the audience view themselves and act in their lives outside the
legal arena. The fact of being named a class representative in a
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court document may lend a certain boldness that helps a "victim" of discrimination see herself not only as a legally debilitated victim (Bumiller 1988) but also as a "class representative" at the head of a group of similarly situated persons. Both
statuses are legal constructs, but it may be that the class action's particular constructs add special dimensions to the conflict which proceeds in daily lives at the same time a lawsuit
meanders through court. As the metaphor of the legal drama
suggests, the impact of the legally translated account on the
audience may in turn have an impact on the unfolding legal
story. A class representative, for example, may gain information from others who respond to that status, and the information may affect subsequent legal developments.
Empirical study informed by this perspective would examine the impacts of the full range of empowering and
nonempowering features of class action litigation. It would investigate particular revelations from discovery, the denial or
granting of various motions in the case, the judges' seeming
attitude toward settlement or the merits, the shifting of legal
theories or class representatives, or simply the effect of delay
and inactivity; and it would investigate how ground-level events
affect the lawsuit. Litigation events, depending on what the audience perceives itself or perceives through lawyer translators
explaining the significance in terms of settlement value, may
have a notable impact on the individuals, particularly the class
representatives whose lives are involved in the litigation. The
last point leads to a concluding caution. Those who belittle the
importance of class representatives to class actions need to
consider not just what happens in lawyers' offices and courts,
and not just the results, but also the complex situation of the
persons whose statuses are constructed and lives inevitably affected by the filing and conduct of litigation.
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